I am a PhD student in Economics, affiliated with FAIR at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), and with the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD), Dhaka.
Research Interests:
I am a development economist working at the intersection of public and labour economics.
I am on the Economics Job Market 2025/2026.
Across settings, I study how economic frictions at the government and household levels, shape the effectiveness of public programs.
In 2023, I was a Visiting Research Scholar at Department of Economics, University of Oxford, hosted by Abi Adams.
In 2020, I was a CEGA Fellow at Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, hosted by Edward Miguel.
Previously, I worked with BRAC in Uganda and Oxford Policy Management in India. I hold a Masters from the London School of Economics and studied my Bachelors from University of Delhi.
with Diwakar Kishore (The Norwegian Association for Economists' prize for best paper by a PhD)
Abstract: Despite years of transparency reforms, their impact on civic participation is not well understood. We study whether government performance information from one of the largest transparency initiatives can motivate citizens to participate and whether changes in beliefs are the mechanisms driving this effect. The initiative tracks 112 of India’s 806 most underperforming districts across key development indicators and posts performance information online for public accountability. We conducted a randomized field experiment with 2,107 adults in a district targeted by the initiative. Over 90% in our setting were unaware of the initiative, and 75% overestimated their district’s performance. Our low-cost, scalable video intervention informed citizens that their district was included, revealed its declining performance relative to neighboring districts, and listed formal grievance channels. Citizens randomly assigned to watch the video were 5 pp more likely to sign the petitions and 8.4 pp more likely to attend workshops on complaint filing portals. They updated beliefs about their district’s low rank and became more aware of the initiative. Citizens who initially overestimated their district’s rank updated their beliefs and increased participation, while we observed no effects among those who had not overestimated prior to treatment. Beliefs about citizens’ influence over service delivery remained unchanged. One month later, beliefs about the district’s rank converged, yet citizens in the intervention group continued to meet civic officials and file complaints. Those who initially overestimated their district’s rank remained significantly more likely to participate. To explain why citizens continue participating despite low perceived influence, we develop a model where participation depends on expected performance gaps relative to aspirational service levels and perceived influence over government. Larger perceived gaps alone can sustain participation through an accountability channel. These findings have implications for 250 million Indians in most-underperforming districts and highlight how prior beliefs mediate effectiveness of transparency programs.
Abstract: We present evidence from a randomized controlled trial in Uganda where married women were randomly provided unconditional cash transfers. Among treated women, we randomized the modality of payment (in cash or mobile money) and whether the beneficiary's spouse was informed about the transfer or not. We find that using mobile money for cash transfers is more effective in improving women's economic independence and decision-making power. In particular, women in the mobile money treatments have higher individual labor income and more of a say in household decisions. On the other hand, cash-based transfers are more effective in reducing intimate partner violence (IPV), especially when both partners are informed. This highlights a trade-off between improving the effectiveness of cash transfers on women's economic empowerment versus reducing IPV. While providing cash transfers digitally is more effective in improving women's control over resources, this may lower their effectiveness in addressing IPV.
Summary: Parenting interventions in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) often rely on intensive training and close supervision of Community Health Workers (CHWs), making them challenging to scale. At the same time, cash transfers can ease financial constraints but may not be sufficient to shift parenting behaviours on their own. It remains unclear how to cost-effectively combine these approaches to support holistic child development. We conducted a large-scale Randomized Controlled Trial in Dodoma, Tanzania, to evaluate the relative effectiveness of three Early Childhood Development (ECD) intervention packages delivered during the child’s first 1,000 days—from conception to age two. The interventions included: (i) a parenting program delivered by CHWs supported by a digital app; (ii) an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) program; and (iii) a combination of both. This study addresses that gap by testing the individual and joint impacts of parenting support and cash transfers, helping identify scalable solutions for early childhood development in resource-limited settings.
Summary: In a randomized cash transfer program in rural Tanzania, mothers assigned as recipients could receive funds via mobile money or nominate another person to receive the transfer on their behalf. We show that women with limited digital access are substantially more likely to nominate, and thus less likely to directly receive the transfers intended for them. Among those who nominate, women with lower autonomy in the household, are more likely to nominate their spouse. Because intermediaries can either return the cash or gain control over how to spend it, these nomination patterns can shift effective control away from the targeted women. Thus, the women most in need of empowerment, may be the least likely to receive and benefit from the transfers. These findings highlight a key challenge for targeted transfer policies: without addressing underlying digital and intra-household constraints, programs may fail to reach and empower the intended beneficiaries.
Summary: Public service delivery in low- and middle-income countries is often constrained by weak state capacity and limited accountability. We evaluate India's Aspirational Districts Programme—one of the world's largest policy-monitoring initiatives—which publicly tracks and posts performance data for 112 most underperforming districts to accelerate development. Leveraging administrative data from 6000 Right to Information Requests, national health and education surveys and satellite data, we estimate the program's impact on public service delivery, public financial management, and bureaucratic transfers. Our findings will reveal whether transparency through improved information systems can enhance governance outcomes and close persistent development gaps across poorest regions.
Summary: This paper evaluates how local governments respond to citizen complaints about recurring civic problems, such as monsoon flooding and irregular garbage collection, when those complaints are voiced on social media. Although residents frequently tag municipal authorities in their posts, follow-through is uneven: some complaints prompt action while others receive little attention. Drawing on administrative records, we trace the path of complaints from online posting to government response and identify the points where action stalls. Our findings will speak to the institutional frictions limiting digital channels’ ability to improve urban service delivery accountability.